Priority setting in radiation policy is complex because it depends to a large extent on risk perception. It has been shown repeatedly that the public is much more sensitive to potential harmful sequelae of radiation than to those of other environmental pollutants. Thus, cancer risk, particularly at low doses, has become a sociopolitical issue. The principle that radiation causes cancer, is life shortening, and causes an array of other pathologic disorders, is well accepted yet the quantification of sequelae at the lower end point of the dose-response curve is still controversial. The presence of a significant carcinogenic effect at very low doses has strong financial implications. Sociopolitical and economic values play a major role in the interpretation of available data. Thus, the use of nuclear energy is a function of risk/benefit, pressures, available alternatives, and cost. Three case studies-nuclear plant workers, children irradiated for an essentially benign condition, and food safety-are used to illustrate polar policy decisions.
Health policy may be defined as a series of decision processes focusing on two issues: resource allocation and regulation (1) . To make the correct decision in such a framework (which usually means a 70:30 breakdown on the average) we need data to establish priorities and compute benefit versus risk ratios.
Priority setting in radiation policy is complex because it depends to a large extent on risk perception. It has been shown repeatedly that the public is much more sensitive to potential harmful sequelae of radiation than to those of other environmental pollutants such as smoking (2) . The reason for this dissonance may be that whereas self-poisoning by smoking is voluntary, radiation is attributed to the government or "the establishment" in general. Thus, cancer risk, particularly at low levels, has become a sociopolitical issue.
Decision-making Models
The considerations involved in formulating policy may be illustrated by two sets of models. If we first consider regulation, we have four theoretical situations: ++ (positive-positive)/--(negative-negative)/+ -(positive-negative)/-+ (negative-positive) as illustrated in Figure 1 .
In fact, only the upper left quadrant is involved in the decision process, as all others are irrelevant: There are no harmless substances and we are not interested in items providing no benefit.
The principle that radiation causes cancer, is life shortening, and causes an array of other pathologic disorders, is well accepted but the quantification of sequelae at the lower end point of the dose-response curve is still controversial. Therefore it is of utmost importance to have valid data on the potential hazard of low-dose radiation. Let us not forget that in contrast with the delivery of high-dose irradiation used either for severe illness or by the military, delivery of low-dose radiation is generally under our control.
The issue of low-dose radiation carcinogenesis has come to the forefront of debate with the slowly accumulating data on excess leukemia near nuclear installations in the United Kingdom, where a significantly increased incidence of leukemia was observed in the West Berkshire area among children younger than 5 years of age and limited to an area < 10 km from the nuclear plant (3-5). Gardner et al. (6) related the excess to an apparent genetic effect through paternal exposure. Subsequent studies in other British locations and elsewhere failed to confirm this notion (7) (8) (9) , which suggests that other factors such as an occasional higher radiation discharge, chemical carcinogens, or contaminated paternal clothing or dust played a much stronger role in the reported leukemogenesis than ionizing radiation. Incidentally, such an excess was noted in areas where nuclear plants were planned but never constructed (10) .
Practically any regulatory process is a function of economic considerations. In our case alternate energy options are available, e.g., oil or coal. Because the presence of a significant carcinogenic effect at very low radiation doses would have strong financial implications, sociopolitical and economic values play a major role in the interpretation of available data and blur the assessment of available information. In other words, the use of nuclear energy is a function of available alternatives and cost.
Let us now consider our second policy model, which is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Again, we deal with four plus and minus options but in this model all four quadrants are of interest. However, the most problematic quadrant is in the upper right. The financial deficit results primarily from the continuous technological development that strains our life system. In an era when the principles of a welfare society are often This paper is based on a presentation at the International Conference on Radiation and Health held [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] November 1996 in Beer Sheva, Israel. Abstracts of these papers were previously published in Public Health Reviews 24(3-4):205-431 (1996) . (11) .
The study cohort included 10,834 irradiated subjects, 10,834 nonirradiated population comparison subjects, and 5392 nonirradiated siblings. The mean year of irradiation was 1956 and the mean age at irradiation was 7.1 years.
Several sets of follow-up data from this population showed that the irradiated subjects had a significantly elevated risk of cancer of the head and neck, with an overall relative risk of 2. Meningiomas were outstandingly increased (relative risk> 10) (12) . A dose response was demonstrated, but of particular interest was the excess of thyroid and breast cancer despite the low doses delivered to these organs (13, 14) .
In this particular case the government accepted responsibility for the supposedly beneficial radiation treatment that was initiated in good faith but proved detrimental. Truly, the ultimate motive for legislation might not have been devoid of political considerations. Nevertheless, each individual who can provide proof of irradiation during the period under consideration, either in Israel or en route, and who developed head or neck cancer, is now being financially compensated.
This law is extremely liberal. Because the average age of the irradiated population today is close to 50 years of age (ranging from 37 to 60), approximately two out of every three compensated persons would have contracted cancer even if not irradiated.
The difference in policy between this group and those employed in the nuclear industry is rooted in the working principle that unwilling and unknowing exposure to a deleterious agent must be compensated.
Conclusion
Obviously, both models are schematic. In real life a third factor representing pressures-political, economic, or socialintervenes in the decision-making process. In the case of nuclear plants, the apparent benefit outweighs the potential harm. Economic pressures tilt in the direction of establishing the plant by minimizing the potential harm and applying adequate protective measures. Similarly, considering needs and resources, economic pressures push policy forward into effect unless strongly opposed by citizen groups.
By the same token, in the case of massive scalp irradiation of children for an essentially benign condition, overeagerness to treat promotes a positive vector when harm versus benefit is assessed. This notion probably affected the decision-making process at the time, to compensate for the lack of sufficient resources.
Both of these decisions were made almost 40 years ago. If one attempted to simulate a theoretical decision of this kind today, only one of the two (i.e., the one to start a nuclear plant) would survive, as economic powers opposition and strict radiation protection appears to minimize the risk. On the other hand, we know much much more today about delayed risks of head irradiation to children in terms of cancer and brain damage (11) (12) (13) .
Finally, the recent controversy with regard to commercial application of food irradiation may provide an appropriate upto-date example and illustrate the general validity of our model. Food 
